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1.  Introduction  
 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU), with as many as twelve new 
members – the ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs): Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and  Bulgaria), besides Malta and Cyprus – which are negotiating their 
access, represents one of the most important events in the European  construction 
process, with far-reaching repercussions both for the candidates and for the 
present members. Amongst these we could single out the consequences for the 
regional policy of the Union, in particular that financed with Structural Funds, 
which will be particularly important for Spain.  
 
Indeed, the considerable difference in  per capita  income level of the 
candidates in relation to the Fifteen means that their accession entails a   
“statistical” drop in the average per capita income levels of the enlarged EU. To 
be specific, if, as decided at the Copenhagen Council, enlargement initially 
affects ten candidates – all of them except for Bulgaria and Romania-,  giving 
rise to the EU (25), Community per capita income measured in Purchasing Power 
Parities would undergo a drop of over 9% in relation to the EU(15).  However, 
since  per capita income  - whether defined in national (in the case of the  
Cohesion Fund) or regional  (in that of the Structural Funds) terms – in relation 
to the EU average is, precisely, the fundamental variable for establishing the 
eligibility of the countries and regions as beneficiaries of the Funds, enlargement 
entails two important effects: on the one hand, pressure on regional policy 
expenditures, since, if the same criteria continued to be applied, practically all the 
regions of the future members would  be beneficiaries of them - in fact, with the 
latest data available, those of the three-year period 1997-1999, only Prague, 
Bratislava and Cyprus would be excluded from the major regional policy funds, 
those relating to Objective 1, i.e. only 2.3% of the population of the candidate 
countries would not benefit from these funds; and on the other, reductions in the   3 
funds received by the present members who now benefit from them as a result of 
the “merely statistical” rise in their  per capita income level in relation to the EU 
average. 
 
In anticipation of these effects and with a view to the preparation of the 
future financial framework of the Community Budget for the period  2007-2013, 
the Commission is considering different reforms. In this respect, the aim of this 
study is to assess these possible reforms, attaching special importance to their 
impacts on the Spanish economy, and on the basis of this, put forward a proposal 
regarding what is considered to be most appropriate. 
 
With this aim the study is structured in the following way. Section 2 starts 
off by offering a brief review of the main recent economic ideas supporting the 
existence of regional policies and goes on to discuss the evidence on the course 
of regional income distribution in the EU and how this has been influenced by 
European regional policy. The purpose of section 3 is to explain the objectives 
and main instruments of Community regional policy at the present time, as this 
would be the benchmark for the possible reforms that might be implemented with 
a view to enlargement. In section 4 we examine the course of regional policy 
from the standpoint of its relative importance in the Union Budget, and we 
evaluate Spain’s participation vis-á-vis the other EU countries. The next two 
sections analyze the impact of accession of the candidates on Structural Funds 
and on Cohesion Funds, i.e. on the two key instruments of Community regional 
policy. In section 5, we take as the benchmark the current financial perspectives: 
those covering the period 2000-2006, while in section 6 the benchmark used is 
the future budgetary period 2007-2013, the one that will have to be reformed to a 
large extent in order to accommodate the needs of the ten new members, who 
will presumably have joined the EU in 2004. In fact, it is to this that the different 
regional policy reform options contained in the Second Economic and Social 
Cohesion Report refer. Then, this section will offer a reasoned opinion on the 
advisability of their implementation. Lastly, in section 7 we summarize the   4 
conclusions of the study and put forward a series of recommendations regarding 
the best way of fitting the new members into the regional policy without unfairly 
harming the interests of the less developed countries of the Fifteen, such as 
Spain, which continue to need this policy.             
 
2.  Economic justification and aim of the regional policy  
 
The regional policy has an economic justification in the growth models 
developed as of the 80s, which, unlike Solow’s neoclassical model (1956), 
consider the possibility that market dynamics will not result in convergence of  
per capita income levels between countries (regions) and, in some cases, they 
even sustain that it could give rise to divergence processes.  
 
The reasons explaining why disparities could arise in development levels 
between countries (regions) are numerous and varied. Thus, as argued in Romer 
(1986), one of the causes of divergence is that  – as opposed to what is postulated 
by Solow’s model – returns on physical capital are not decreasing. In this case, it 
could happen that countries (regions) with lower capital stocks and income levels 
may experience less intense capital accumulation processes and slower growth 
rates, which will not permit their convergence towards the richer countries 
(regions). In Lucas’s model (1988), where human capital is considered to be the 
main driving force of growth, reference is made to the existence of rising returns 
in this factor and the possibility therefore arises that there could be a movement 
of human capital from the poor countries (regions) to the rich ones; i.e. there 
could be a “brain drain” in detriment to the potential development of the less 
prosperous countries (regions). Similarly, many of the endogenous growth 
models, which, in line with what is postulated by Romer (1990), have underlined 
the importance for growth of carrying on R&D activities, make it possible to 
explain the continuing differences in technology and income levels between 
countries (regions). Lastly, some studies – for instance Aschauer (1989, 2000), 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) or Argimón et al. (1997) – stress the role of certain   5 
types of physical capital, especially of infrastructure, in economic growth and, in 
this respect, they argue how important government action is in improving the 
growth capacity of the less advanced countries (regions) and propitiating income 
level convergence. In this respect, investments in transport and communications 
infrastructure are considered to be one of those that have the greatest impact on 
the growth of the less prosperous countries (regions).  
  
Furthermore, the recent theoretical developments that have taken place in the 
Field of  spatial  economy may also provide an additional justification for  
regional policy. Indeed, these models, which made their initial appearance in  
Krugman (1991) and have given rise to the so-termed “new economic 
geography,”
1 sustain a variety of different reasons, including the existence of 
economies of agglomeration, to explain the phenomena of polarization of 
economic activity in certain areas and, consequently, give grounds for arguing 
the advisability of compensatory policies that facilitate a more harmonious 
spatial income distribution.  
 
In fact, economies of agglomeration – or positive externalities associated with 
the spatial concentration of productive activities – may explain why the regions 
that have a higher level of development represent a focal point of attraction for 
new activities, so that wealth accumulation processes are thereby fomented in 
these regions. More specifically, one may argue that the combination of growing 
returns of scale and transport costs encourages companies to locate close to the 
largest markets, which in turn become places of business concentration, with the 
result that, even though they may also admit the existence of  factors that foster a 
more spatially disperse business localization – in particular the probable higher 
labour costs in areas where this business concentration occurs  – they help to 
explain  numerous situations in which factors tending towards polarization 
prevail (for more detail see Puga’s, 2002).     
                                                 
1 Interesting surveys m ay be found in Otaviano y Puga (1998), Martin (1999), Neary (2001) and Puga 
(2002).    6 
Some models formulated by the new economic geography also provide a 
better guide for evaluating the impact of investments in transport infrastructure in 
economic development, to the extent that they inform that such an impact is in 
turn affected by the conditions of the economic environment. Thus, for instance, 
they point out  that, in a context of the absence of interregional labour mobility 
and  wage differentials, transport infrastructure investment policies lose their 
effectiveness as a measure for fomenting income convergence of the less 
developed areas (Venables and Gasiorek, 1999; Puga, 2002).    
 
Besides the theory, the empirical studies conducted to evaluate the per capita 
income differences between countries (regions) of the EU also enable us to 
corroborate  the advisability of a  regional policy in the European Union.  
 
Indeed, the countless studies conducted in the last few years with different 
methodologies coincide in pointing out that the imbalances are high – both in 
absolute terms and in comparison with those occurring in the USA  – and they 
have not decreased significantly with time. In fact, it has been found that, even 
when a convergence in per capita income is recorded between the countries of 
the Union, differences between the regions (defined with the level of 
decentralization corresponding to our Autonomous Communities, i.e. for the  
NUT-II) of the EU – where inequality is also much more marked – have hardly 
decreased (see amongst others: Cánova and Marcet, 1995; Neven and Gouyette, 
1995; López-Bazo et al., 1999; Boldrin and Cánova, 2001, and the two Reports 
prepared by the Commission on economic and social cohesion in the EU: EC, 
1996 and 2001).               
 
Furthermore, the studies conducted suggest that Community regional policy 
has made a positive contribution to economic cohesion within the EU. Thus, this 
conclusion is reached in Beutel (1995) after estimating the impact of the 
Structural Funds for Objective 1 regions by means of the Input-Output model. 
Several studies based on simulating the effects of the Structural Funds from the   7 
HERMIN macroeconomic model – Herce and Sosvilla (1994 and 1999); Bradley, 
Modesto and Sosvilla (1995); Bradley (2000) and Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis 
(1998) – conclude likewise that these have been beneficial for the growth of the 
cohesion countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain). Roeger’s study (1998) 
conducted on the basis of the QUEST II model also coincide in this result. More 
recently, De la F uente (2001) finds that the effect of the Structural Funds 
received by the Objective 1 regions over the period 1994-99 was positive and far-
reaching.   
 
There are, however, a few studies that cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
Community regional policy, in particular one by Boldrin and Cánova (2001), 
where, after evaluating the course of convergence between EU regions over the 
last twenty years, saving in the case of Ireland, the regions of the main 
beneficiary countries were not found to show better results. However, as argued 
in  Ederveen et al. (2001), this result, contrary to general evidence, could be due 
to a problem of omission of variables. In this same respect, see Boeri et al. 
(2002).  
 
In short, both in the recent literature on economic growth and in the models 
developed in the area of spatial economy, reasons are put forward to question the 
idea that market dynamics may bring about harmonious development among the 
countries and regions or, at least, that the trend towards convergence in their 
income levels may be brought to a successful conclusion within a reasonable 
period of time. However, on the whole, the empirical evidence available supports 
the view that Community regional policy has benefited the growth of the less 
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  3. European regional policy. Main aims and instruments  
 
EU concern for income level imbalances between regions and Member 
States – or, in community terms: economic cohesion – has gone on increasing 
with the passing of time, with the result that regional policy has taken on a 
growing importance as the integration process advances and new members join 
the project. Thus, from being a merely token consideration, the aim of reducing 
inequalities in the territorial distribution of income  has become one of the 
essential principles of the European construction process and, therefore, the 
second largest item in the EU budget (the largest is the CAP), accounting for 
over 30 per cent.  
 
The main milestones in the European regional policy consolidation 
process are, first of all, the establishment of the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) in 1975, in response to the negative effects of the energy crisis, 
which were particularly serious in certain Community regions  and as a result of 
the accession of Ireland, a country with a development level below the average of 
the earlier members. The second most decisive step in the shaping of European 
regional policy was taken in 1988, after the approval of the Single European Act 
to build a single market, with no borders restricting the movement of goods, 
services, capital and people, and coinciding practically with the accession of 
other members, Portugal and Spain, which, like Greece, whose accession had 
taken place a few years before, also had a below average per capita income level. 
In fact, on this occasion the funds assigned to regional policy were doubled and 
its aims and specific instruments were reformed.  
 
Later, within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, when the 
foundations were laid for the formation of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), Community regional policy was once again strengthened. This took the 
form, inter alia, of the creation of the Cohesion Fund, with the basic aim of 
making the strict nominal convergence conditions stipulated as a prerequisite for   9 
forming part of the EMU compatible for the less developed countries of the EU – 
Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain – with their larger investment needs in order 
to make progress towards income convergence with the more prosperous 
members. Finally, in order to prepare the enlargement of the CEECs, regional 
policy was again subjected to reform. This got under way with the approval of 
Agenda 2000,  and its application is still in progress.   
 
Before proceeding to comment on the main  aims and instruments of 
regional policy today, we should underline a feature of its past history on account 
of its special significance for the debate on the new reform that will have to be 
undertaken with a view to the accession planned for 2004 of the candidates now 
in the course of negotiation. It is a question of the increase in funds which has 
usually accompanied the previous episodes of integration that involved the 
accession of countries with a level of development below the EU average, 
something that is going to be repeated, and in a much more pronounced way, in 
the case of the CEECs, whose income gap is huge. This is certainly an important 
fact that conflicts with the reluctance being shown by the present members of the 
EU, particularly those that are net contributors to the Community budget due to 
their higher level of development, to increase regional policy funding in order to 
be able to meet the needs of the new members without neglecting those of the 
members of the EU who continue to require them. Having said this, let us go on 
now to describe briefly the nature of European regional policy being applied 
under the current budget for the period 2000-2006. 
 
European regional policy is primarily based on the use of two types of  
Funds: 1) Structural Funds and 2) Cohesion Funds, which finance the Structural 
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The Structural Funds are in turn made up of the following four Funds: 
 
a)  ESF (European Social Fund), which was set up in 1960 with the aims of 
supporting measures for preventing and combating unemployment, 
developing human resources and fomenting social integration in the 
labour market. 
 
b)  FEOGA- Guidance (European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance 
Fund, guidance section), set up in 1962 and aimed at rural development 
and the adjustment of agricultural structures. 
 
c)  ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), established in 1975 with 
a view to correcting the main regional imbalances and participation in the 
development and restructuring of the regions with the aim of promoting 
economic and social cohesion. 
 
d)  FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), which has been in 
operation since 1993 with the aim of restructuring the fishing sector, 
creating favourable conditions for its development and modernization. 
 
These Funds are distributed in accordance with four principles:  
 
•  Cooperation: it procures maximum collaboration between the 
Commission and the national, regional or local authorities of each 
Member State involved, from the preparatory stage up to the application 
of measures. 
 
•  Additionality: it means that European funds should be added to national 
funds and not replace them. 
   11
•  Programming: it consists of the creation of multi-annual development 
programmes and it is carried out by means of a cooperative decision 
process involving public or private project sponsors. 
 
•  Concentration: action on a limited number of Objectives, which at this 
time have been reduced to three.  
 




Structural development and adjustment of the less developed regions: this 
Objective is aimed at the regions – at level II of statistical territorial unit 
nomenclature (NUTS) – which have a per capita income measured in purchasing 
power parities (PPP) below  75% of the EU average with the figures of the last 
three-year period available at the time of preparation of the financial prospects 
(Structural Fund Regulations, EC 1260/1999 of the Council of 21 June 1999). 
This objective also covers the ultra-peripheral regions  – amongst which the 
Canary Islands are considered to be included  – as well as unpopulated areas 
included in the old Objective 6. This Objective 1 is the one that absorbs most 




Economic and social reconversion of areas with structural deficiencies: these 
areas have to meet the following conditions: a) an unemployment rate above the 
Community average recorded in the course of the last three years b) an industrial 
job proportion of total employment equal to or above the Community average in 
a benchmark year c) a confirmed decline in industrial employment from the 
benchmark year. This Objective also includes low density rural areas that are   12
losing population, as well as high population density urban areas with 




Adaptation and modernization of education, training and employment policies 
and systems: these are funds of a horizontal nature applicable to areas outside 
Objective 1. 
 
To supplement the funds distributed to co-finance the regional development 
activities proposed by the national agencies, the Community has the capacity to 
propose actions programmes directly which are called Community Initiatives. At 
present there are four of these: INTERREG, LEADER, EQUAL y URBAN. 
 
q  INTERREG: the aim of this Initiative is to promote cross-border, 
transnational and interregional cooperation. 
q  LEADER: it is geared to fomenting rural development through local 
action group initiatives. 
q  EQUAL: its aim is foment the fight against discrimination and inequalities 
of all kinds in relation to access to the labour market. 
q  URBAN: aimed at promoting the economic and social revitalization of  
cities and peripheral urban areas in crisis. 
 
For its part, the Cohesion Fund, finances projects aimed at improving the 
environment and modernizing infrastructure in Member States that have a per 
capita income below 90% of the Community average. 
 
As during the period 1993-1999, for the period 2000-2006 the beneficiary 
countries will be Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Before the end of 2003, 
however,  these countries’ right to aid will be re-examined in accordance with the 
updated relative per capita GNP. In this respect, it is to be expected that Ireland   13 
will cease to benefit from the Cohesion Fund as its per capita GNP now exceeds 
the EU average by far.   
 
Having described the main instruments of Community regional policy, it is 
helpful to analyze the trend in its relative importance in the EU Budgets in the 
last budgetary periods: (1989-1993), (1994-1999) and the current (2000-2006), as 
well as the participation of each of the member countries. This is what will be 
done in the next section.   
 
4. Development of European regional policy and Spain’s participation vis-à-
vis the other EU countries.  
 
  To assess the impact that the candidates’ accession may have on EU  
regional policy as well as to appraise the appropriateness of the different options 
being considered with a view to bringing it closer in line with the new reality of a 
Union enlarged to 25 (and to 27) members, we should bear in mind the history of 
regional policy over the last few years and, more specifically, the participation 
that the different members have had.  
 
  Although Structural Measures make up the core of European regional 
policy, the set of policies funded by the Community Budget should have a  
regional dimension
2, which it is useful to examine as the starting point for a 
specific analysis of regional policy. Moreover, by setting the analysis of the 
course of Structural Measures within the framework of the set of budgetary items 
as a whole, we may obtain not only a true picture of the development of their 
importance in relation to that of other policies, but also a more appropriate basis 
for appraising the feasibility and relevance of the different reform options. 
 
                                                 
2 In fact in the Treaty of the Union (article 159) it is specified that Communities policies should 
contribute to cohesion.    14 
  Accordingly, as may be observed in TABLE 1, in the course of time and 
alongside the advances taking place in the European integration process in its 
dual aspect of strengthening the ties between members and enlarging their 
number, a notable increase takes place in the resources allocated to Structural 
Measures, which eventually reach a 35% share of total spending. This 
proportion, however, continues to be considerably smaller than that of the CAP, 
which, despite declining in relative importance, is the item that absorbs the 
largest volume of resources: 45%.  
 
At this point the question that arises is which are the main beneficiary 
countries of these growing Structural Measures. Before answering it, however, it 
is worthwhile examining what each country’s net contribution has been to the 
Community budget as a whole in the different periods. For this purpose,  TABLE 
2 sets out the fiscal balances of every Member State in relation to the Union  
budget (as well as the components: funds contributed and funds received) 
expressed as a percentage of the GDP. Upon examining them, we find that most 
of the countries show a negative fiscal balance, i.e. they are net contributors to 
the EU budget, particularly Holland, while the list of net recipients of funds is 
composed  – with a few additions in one or two budgetary periods – of four 
cohesion countries, specifically and in order of the amount of the resources 
received in GDP: Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. At first glance, therefore, 
the EU budget appears to have an equitable inter-country dimension. However, if 
we take a look at GRAPH  1, we can see that this is not wholly the case.  
 
In fact, each EU country is represented in this graph in accordance with its 
difference in per capita income in relation to the EU (x-axis) and the relative per 
capita fiscal balances (y-axis) over the period 1989-2001, applying the method 
proposed by De la Fuente and Doménech (2001), and it is made clear in it that 
the match between these balances and income levels is not perfect. In other 
words, there is not full horizontal equity between the Fifteen.  
   15 
Indeed, the correlation that exists between relative per capita income and 
fiscal balances with the EU, although inverse and significant, shows a low value: 
0.049. Furthermore, it may be observed in GRAPH 1 that there are countries –
such as Luxembourg (Lu), Denmark (Dk), Austria (Au), Ireland (Ir) or Greece 
(Gr)  – that have obtained a much more beneficial fiscal balance than that 
corresponding to them for their per capita income. The circumstance that all 
these countries are relatively small suggests that this feature could have helped 
them to reach this privileged situation when it comes to receiving funds. Thus, 
the substantial grants, in relation to their GDP or population, received by Ireland 
or Greece seem to have been facilitated by the fact of not representing significant 
amounts for the large countries, which are net contributors, such as Germany  
(G), United Kingdom (UK), Sweden (Sw), and The Netherlands (N). In this 
respect, in Spain’s case it could be contended that its considerable size has 
represented an obstacle for receiving funds, as, even though it is a great 
beneficiary of the Community budget in absolute terms, it is not at all so in per 
capita terms. In fact,. it receives less than what would correspond to it. The other 
countries, Belgium, France, Finland and Italy, lie on the actual regression line, 
i.e. they receive “fair” treatment, so they are not represented in order to clarify 
the graph. 
 
Moreover, if we compare the differences between the real and theoretical 
net balances in relation to each country’s GDP, as shown in TABLE 3, we find 
that the positive fiscal balances of Greece and, especially, Ireland are higher than 
their theoretical balance, whereas, to the contrary, the funds received by Spain 
are lower that what would have corresponded to it. It is an important result that 
deserves to be underlined, as it casts doubt on the widespread but, as argued, 
mistaken impression that Spain has been especially favoured by the Community 
budgets. For their part, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands 
and Finland, in this order, have made net contributions in excess of what 
corresponded to them.  Not surprisingly, the first four countries are the ones   16 
exerting most pressure so that the accession of the candidate countries should not 
entail a rise in the annual budget ceiling of  1.27% of the Community GNP.  
 
In other respects,  analysis of the distribution of Structural Measures – 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds – enables us to reiterate the diagnosis that 
Spain has by no means been the country most benefited. The data shown in 
TABLES 4 and 5 are quite explicit in this respect. In fact, the data on the per 
capita resources that have been received by all the countries by way of Structural 
Measures reveal that, naturally, the main recipients have been the four less 
developed countries: Ireland (until a few years ago) Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
but it is well-known that Spain is not the one that has  received most funds per 
capita.     
 
 
5.  Effects of enlargement on the distribution of Structural and Cohesion 
Funds for 2000-2006.  
 
EU enlargement with the accession of the candidate countries may entail 
substantial modifications in the Community budget, in view of the economic 
situation of the future members: agriculture needing reform but still of great 
importance in economic activity and per capita income measured in Purchasing 
Power Parities (PPP) – less than 40% of the EU average. In fact, as may be seen 
in GRAPH 2,  in accordance with the latest data available, those of 2001, the  
candidate countries had an income level considerably below the average of the 
Fifteen and Spain’s.  
 
For their part, in TABLE 6 it may be observed  that, both in terms of 
output and, above all, of employment, in most of the candidate countries the 
importance of agriculture is much higher than in the Fifteen. It should be 
appreciated, however, that there are substantial differences between one country 
and another, from the extreme cases of Romania and Bulgaria, where farming is   17 
still of prime importance, to those of such candidate countries as the Czech 
Republic and  Hungary, which attain levels practically on a par with Community 
ones. Still, the average of the ten countries that will surely join the EU in 2004 
leads us to predict that these countries will exert heavy pressure on the 
Community funds allocated to the CAP, particularly Poland.      
 
In short, from what has been said it may be inferred that the most 
significant budgetary impacts of enlargement will be focused on two items: the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) and regional policy, put into effect with  
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. 
 
In July 1997 the European Commission presented the document Agenda 
2000, in which two subjects of particular importance for the future of the EU 
were addressed: the financial framework for the period 2000-2006 and 
enlargement
3. This framework was accepted with hardly any modifications at the 
Berlin Summit of March 1999. There, the ceiling of the Community budget was 
set at 1.27% of the GNP of the Fifteen, the same ratio, therefore, as that  
stipulated for 1999 in the earlier financial plans.  
 
The distribution of expenditure among the different Community policies 
designed at the Berlin Summit for 2000-2006 allocated the bulk of Community 
funds, over 80% of the total, to the FEOGA-Guarantee and Structural Measures. 
In addition, it established a gradual increase in the funding of the candidate 
countries, whose accession was then scheduled for 2002, in reference to the six 
countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus), 
which it was thought at the time would be the first ones to join. Finally, it was 
agreed to create two new pre-accession instruments: SAPARD (Special 
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA 
(Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession). 
                                                 
3 The European Commission made this proposal in the framework of the Interinstitucional Agreement 
which defines the  procedure to be followed in order to lay down the EU budgetary policy and forwarded 
it subsequently, in March 1998, to the Council and to the Parliament for discussion and approval.   18 
 However, as the date of accession of  new members was put back to  2004 
and it was found that this could include ten of the candidates (all of them except 
Bulgaria and Romania), the budgetary framework approved at Berlin has had to 
be adjusted. This adjustment was carried out at the Brussels Summit of 24-25 
October 2002, where, besides approving a timetable for enlargement, some  
modifications were introduced into budgetary allocations for the final years of 
2004  - 2006, of the current period, yet maintaining the ceiling for total 
expenditure agreed in Berlin, while certain prior agreements were reached with a 
view to the coming budgetary period.  Specifically, the EU will use the foreseen 
funds that will be saved  in 2002 and 2003 in relation to the financial  
perspectives approved in Berlin, when enlargement was scheduled for 2002, to 
finance the enlargement to ten members instead of the six that had been 
contemplated in Berlin. Furthermore, we should mention the process of gradual 
participation of the new members in the CAP direct funds: 25% en 2004, a 5 
percentage point increase until reaching  40% in 2007, and increments of 10% 
from then on until attaining the same level of aid as applied to the Fifteen in 
2013; the establishment also of a ceiling for CAP expenditure up to 2013, the 
same as for spending in 2006, with a maximum annual increase of 1%  in  
nominal terms. Finally, insofar as Structural Measures are concerned, a total of 
23 milliard  euro is earmarked for enlargement for the period and it is considered 
that a third of  the funds should be allocated to the Cohesion Fund. 
  
Taking into account the technical adjustments of the financial  
perspectives carried out with the 2002 Community budget and the decisions of 
the Brussels Summit and the Copenhagen Council, we have produced TABLE 7 
in order to show how the budget would finally appear for the period 2000-2006. 
The table shows a break-down of the allocations to the present and to the future 
members. In this way, it is easy to observe that after 2004, the year planned for 
the accession of the new members,  they will go on absorbing a rising proportion 
of Community budgetary spending until becoming, in 2006, the recipients of  
14% of total credits for payments. Of these, the most substantial item goes to    19 
Structural Measures. Obviously, in view of the budgetary ceiling set, the gradual 
increase of the share of the new members entails a gradual decrease in the share 
of the Fifteen. In this respect, it is important to observe that, within the Fifteen, 
the countries relatively worst affected are the main beneficiaries of the regional 
policy implemented on the basis of the Structural Measures on account of their 
lower economic development.  
 
This is the reason why the unfairness of a system of enlargement funding 
like this one has been criticized, as it puts the cost of the burden of solidarity with 
the new members mainly on the shoulders of the members of the current EU who 
are most in need of regional policy aid because of their lower income level. 
Hence, even though the governments of the present members of the Union  that 
are net contributors to the Community budget have not proved very receptive to 
these criticisms, the Commission has indeed taken them up and given them 
consideration in the preparation of the future financial perspectives for the 
Community budget of 2007-2013. In fact, in the Second Cohesion Report, the 
Commission already advanced some proposals aimed at addressing the problem 
of the “statistical effect” in the assignment of the Structural Measures, which we 
will consider in the next section, once we have evaluated the significance and 
consequences of this effect.   
 
   
6.  The consequences of enlargement on the Structural Measures of the 
future 2007-2013 budget and the proposed reforms 
 
The accession of the candidates whose mean per capita income is still far 
removed from the EU average EU (15) would involve an increase in the relative 
per capita GDP and GNP of the Fifteen and of their regions, until exceeding, in 
some cases, the limits laid down in Objective 1
4 and in the Cohesion Fund of  
                                                 
4 Remember that Objective 1 also includes ultraperipheral regions – the French overseas departments, 
Azores, Madeira and the Canary Is., as well as areas of Finland and Sweden with low density population 
which benefited from the old Objective 6 over the period 1995-1999.   20 
75% and 90%, respectively. To illustrate the impact that this “statistical effect" of 
enlargement would have on the receipt of funds by the present members, 
including Spain, first of all we prepared TABLE 8. This underlines how in the 
EU (25) and especially in the EU (27) the per capita income of Spain (and of the 
rest of the Fifteen) would undergo an artificial – merely statistical - increase in 
relation to the EU average because this would decrease on account of the 
accession of poorer members, with the result that, if the Cohesion Fund 
allocation criteria were not changed, Spain would lose the Cohesion Fund as a 
result of this fictitious enrichment brought about by this “statistical effect”.   
    
  Secondly, we produced TABLE 9 to illustrate this “statistical effect” at  
regional level. It therefore offers a projection of the average per capita income of 
every EU region for the period 2001-2003, in accordance with the procedure 
explained in box 1
5. On the basis of this simulation  - the full result of which for 
all the regions of the Union is set out in the ANNEX – we prepared TABLE 9, in 
which we indicate the regions that would exceed the limit set for Objective 1 
(75% of Community per capita income) according to each of the three scenarios 
considered: a) no enlargement; b) accession of the candidate countries, with the 
exception of Bulgaria and Romania, EU(25) and, c) accession of these two 
countries to the EU as well prior to establishing the distribution of the next 
financial perspectives 2007-2013, EU(27). 
                                                 
5 The average of the period 2001-2003 was chosen as it may possibly be used as the criterion for deciding 
the regions that may benefit from Objective 1 if the guidelines of the previous financial perspectives are 
maintained. In fact, to draw up the list of areas that would be recipients of these funds over the period 





To obtain the projection of relative regional  per capita income of the EU, we 
started from the data of relative per capita income for 1999 provided by the statistical 
annex of the First Intermediate Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (European 
Commission, 2002). This same source of i nformation supplies the data for the per 
capita income (for every region and for every Member State) for the period 1995-1999. 
In this way, we obtain the relative growth of every region in relation to the country to 
which it belongs in the period 1995-1999.  
 
Furthermore, we have the relative per capita income for the present Member 
States in 2000 and 2001, as well as estimates for 2002 and 2003 made by the European 
Commission (Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical 
Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002). On the assumption that the relative growth 
of the regions which was recorded over the period 1995-1999 will remain stable in 
relation to the countries to which they belong, their relative per capita income is 
projected for t he years 2001-2003. Finally, the average of these three years is 
calculated.  
 
Note that the projection is made on the basis of the relative growth of each 
region in relation to its country, and of the latter in relation to the EU, in order to 
prevent it from being sensitive to the shocks common to all the Member States. Inclusion 
of the candidates in the projections also provides a more realistic evaluation of what 
may be the relative per capita income of the present Community members in 2001-2003, 
for these countries record higher economic growth rates than the UE-15, thereby partly 
reducing the “statistical effect”.  
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Thus, the first block of TABLE 9 sets out the 56 regions of the EU that 
benefit from Objective 1 during the present financial perspective period 2000-
2006. Regions that receive transitory funds, as is the case of Cantabria, have been 
excluded. Greece is the only country that benefits entirely from Objective 1. 
Portugal, for its part, has almost two thirds of its population in areas benefited by 
Objective 1, its whole territory apart from Lisbon.  
 
The second block indicates those regions that would exceed 75% of 
Community per capita income through their own growth pattern not on account 
of enlargement. In fact, the European regions benefiting from Objective 1 have 
reduced the differences in per capita income in relation to the Community 
average over the period 1994-1999. In fact, during these years the regions that 
have benefited from Objective 1 have raised their relative per capita income from  
68% to 71%, and very particularly so in the areas that also obtained funds in the 
period 1989-1993, which have risen from 63% of Community per capita income 
to the level of 71% as well
6.  
 
Accordingly, 15 Community regions could be excluded by their own 
growth pattern above the EU average, including Castilla y León and Comunidad 
Valenciana. The Canary Islands, for their part, would also exceed the limit of  
75%, although it would be possible for them to go on benefiting from Objective 1 
through their ultraperipheral region status.  The regions of Sweden and Finland  
that benefit on account of their low density would be in the same situation. 
Ireland, however, would also lose the second and last Objective 1 region. 
 
In the third block, we find that another 16 regions could be left out of  
Objective 1 on account of EU enlargement.  However, in Spain’s case, only  
Murcia (75.7%) and the Principality of Asturias (78.6%) would be excluded. For 
their part, regions like Galicia, Castilla La-Mancha, Ceuta and Melilla could go 
                                                 
6 In this respect see the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion and the First Interim Report on 
Economic and Social Cohesion (European Commission, 2001 and 2002, respectively).   23 
on benefiting from Objective 1 with enlargement to UE-25. These regions would  
benefit from compliance with the forecasts of the Commission that indicate that 
the higher growth rates in the candidate countries over the period 1995-2001 will 
continue to be recorded until at least 2003. In this way, the “statistical effect” 
would be reduced from 16.5% in the period 1997-1999 to 10.0% in 2001-2003 
(see ANNEX). Spain would come off worst in the last of the scenarios, i.e. if 
accession included Bulgaria and Rumania, as 3 further regions would cease to be 
beneficiaries. In other words, only Andalusia and Extremadura would continue to 
be so. However, Galicia (76.0%), Ceuta and Melilla (75.3%) would be very close 
to the limit determining their eligibility. 
  
Once we have an idea of the foreseeable changes in the list of regions 
benefited by Objective 1 funds, according to the different enlargement scenarios, 
it is of interest to estimate the cost for every country of these aid reduction 
scenarios. For this we used data on the distribution of the Structural Funds for the 
period 1994-1999 (Annual Report on the Structural Funds, European 
Commission, Directorate General for Regional policy) and indicative distribution 
of the period 2000-2006 (Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Community 
Support Framework). See box 2 for further details on the method of estimating 
the cost. The results of this estimation are presented in TABLE 10. 
 
If we examine it, we see that Spain could lose a large part of the  
Objective 1 fund on account of the actual growth rate of the regions. To be 
specific, the magnitude of the funds that would cease to be received would be 
around 0.28% of its GDP a year. Enlargement to the ten candidate countries 
would reduce it even more, around 0.09% a year, so that the loss of funds that the 
Spanish regions receive would amount to 0.37% a year of the GDP. Losses of 
funds would also be substantial in Greece and Portugal.   
 
The costs of enlargement in terms of Objective 1 funds would be higher in 
case of enlargement to 27 countries, in particular for Spain, Italy and Germany in   24 
this order. These three countries have reasons for not wanting the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania to be taken into account when the next financial 
perspectives are set. However, the future of Objective 1 is not prejudicial to The 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden – the three countries that along with Germany 
want to reduce their Community bill. These countries may therefore be expected 
to come out in favour of making the cost of enlargement fall to Objective 1 of the 
Structural Funds, which has a regional nature. In fact, the Dutch government has 
already revealed its proposed reform of the Structural Measures to convert them 
into national grants, as already happens with the Cohesion Fund and Objective 3 
of the Structural Funds. Neither France nor Denmark would be affected by the 
future of Objective 1 either, the four French ultraperipheral regions would 
continue to benefit from these funds in any case, which explains why these two 
countries want enlargement to be financed by a reduction  of the Structural 
Measures in the present Member States instead of by means of adjustments in the 




In order to be able to make an approach to the distribution of Structural Funds 
to the Objective 1 regions over the period 2007-2013, we have used the data  published 
by the Directorate General for Regional Policy in the Annual Reports on the Structural 
Funds. The latest one is the report for 2000, and it sets out the distribution of the funds 
of each Objective among the EU regions for the whole of the period 1994-1999. Note 
that Objective 1 is assigned to the regions, but its management falls partly to the 
Autonomous Administrations and partly to the Central Administration of every Member 
State. Both expenditures are regionalized in the statistical annex of the above-
mentioned Report, although it is not possible to know the region that benefited from all 
the funds managed by the Central Administration, either because of their multi-regional 
nature or because of the difficulty of imputing them. This source provides information 
not only of funds already executed (payment credits), but also of the total of those 
scheduled (commitment credits). The information relative to commitment credits will be 
used here, as it offers a more reliable picture of the real distribution of Objective 1 
irrespective of the rate of its execution. 
       
In the case of the Spanish regions we have also made use of the Objective 1 
indicative distribution for the period 2000-2006, which appears in the Community 
Support Framework (Regional Development Plan, regions included in Objective nº 1 of 
the European Structural Funds, Volume I, II and III, Ministry of Finance).  
 
We made the estimate on the basis of these data, assuming that the distribution 
of the funds amongst the regions recorded during the period 1994-1999 will remain 
stable amongst those that continue to benefit from  Objective 1 during 2000-2006. This 
assumption  - which is not needed in Spain’s case because we have more data – seems 
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Box 2 (cont.) 
 
(also used by the countries for their subsequent distribution amongst regions) are  
basically structural. In fact, these criteria set out in article 8 of the Structural Fund 
Regulations are: population of the regions that are entitled to obtain funds, regional 
and national prosperity and relative seriousness of the structural problems, especially 
the unemployment level. These criteria are, moreover, very similar to those that were 
used in the previous period, i.e. it is foreseeable that those of successive periods will not 
differ much either. In fact, distribution of the Objective 1 funds by countries for the   
period 2000-2006 is very much like that of 1994-1999 (which may be found in the First 
Cohesion Report, European Commission, 1996). 
 
Thus, from the sum that every country has assigned by Objective 1 for the  
period 2000-2006 the percentage was subtracted that was absorbed during the period 
1994-1999 by the regions which: a) would exceed 75% even without enlargement, 
according to the projections in the annex; b) would surpass that barrier if  the 
enlargement extended to the ten candidate countries and c) would exceed that limit if 
Romania and Bulgaria joined as well. The proportional part of the multi-regional funds 
of the regions that are left out of Objective 1 were also deducted from this remaining 
amount. Finally, the funds were updated with the EU price index in 2000 and 2001, as 
the Objective 1 indicative distribution by countries was in milliards of euros of 1999. 
 
That is to say, TABLE 10 sets out the cost of each scenario in every Member 
State, assuming that the total amount of Objective 1 to be distributed in the period 
2000-2006 among the current Member States is the same as what would be distributed 
in 2007-2013. 
 
Note, however, that this cost will be the upper limit, as the Commission will no 
doubt find transitory funds for the regions that are left out of  Objective 1. 
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In response to the concern shown by the Member States with regard to the 
serious consequences of enlargement on regional policy, and in order to come up 
with a more satisfactory solution for the forthcoming 2007-2013 budget than the 
extrapolation of the current criteria for the distribution of funds, in its Second 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (see EC, 2001) – as well as in the  First 
Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion COM (2002)  – the 
Commission put forward a series of proposed regional policy reforms.  
 
They are proposals that try and prevent the so-called “statistical effect” from 
making a good number of the regions of the Fifteen cease to be eligible in the  
distribution of the Structural Funds in the EU (25) or EU (27). Accordingly, 
although they mention as a possibility the application of the present threshold of 
75% irrespective of the number of countries that may join – which means not 
introducing any remedy for the problem of the “statistical effect”, they favour 
one of the other three options considered. Namely: 
 
a)  Establish a mechanism of transitory funds (phasing-out) for the regions 
that would have a per capita income of less than 75% of the average of the 
EU (15) at the end of the current perspectives, i.e. in the absence of 
enlargement. 
b)  Raise the criterion of eligibility up to a level equivalent to what would be 
necessary to prevent the regions of the Fifteen from being excluded by a 
mere statistical effect of reduction of their differential in relation to the  
per capita income of the enlarged EU. 
c)  Lay down two criteria for eligibility, one for the regions of the Fifteen 
another for the  future members. 
 
Accordingly, in the light of this situation we consider that we have to start off 
by ruling out, on account of its irrationality and, certainly, its lack of solidarity, 
the option – practically ruled out by the Commission, though not by some of the 
most developed countries of the Fifteen which are net contributors to the   28 
Community budget – of maintaining the present criteria since, and it should be 
underlined,  this would mean not correcting the “statistical effect” and, therefore, 
exercising solidarity with the new members at the cost, fundamentally, of the less 
prosperous members of the Union.   
 
Having said this, it seems that of the three options considered by the 
Commission the most suitable one, on account of its more functional character, 
would be the first. In fact, the Commission has given a few signs of its preference 
for it.  
 
Any how, these are obviously not the only options and, from the technical 
point of view at least, it may be argued that there are other better ones. Thus, 
specifically, a possible way of preventing the reduction of aid through Structural 
Measures in the Fifteen which would entail accession of the new members 
without altering the budgetary ceiling would be to make significant cuts in the 
funds allocated to other items, especially to the largest of these: the CAP. In fact, 
as we know, the CAP finances three types of measures: 
 
a)  Direct aid: subsidies for farmers as compensatory payments for the 
reduction of support prices agreed in the MacSharry reform of 1992, in 
order to stabilize agricultural earnings. It is the most substantial item, 
which absorbs about 65% of CAP expenditures. 
b)  Market intervention: farm price support measures, including storage 
expenses and export subsidies. It represents around 25% of CAP 
expenditures. 
c)  Rural development: it aims at structural changes and modernization of 
European agriculture by means of diversification of activities and 
income sources, enhanced competitiveness, and conservation of the 
environment and the rural setting. This currently represents only 10% 
of CAP funds.    
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Indeed, there are many reasons, from the standpoint not only of efficiency 
but also of fairness, that would support the advisability of making a reduction in 
the funds allocated to the first two measures. In this respect, we just have to list 
what have been the most recurrent criticisms that the CAP direct aid and market 
interventions have received in the course of its long period of existence. In short, 
with regard to efficiency, there is strong evidence that the CAP has the following  
problems: 
 
•  It causes a trade diversion effect that raises the price of products 
for EU consumers 
•  It interferes with the adjustment of inefficient farms which could 
not exist in the absence of protection and subsidies and, therefore, 
represents an impediment to growth 
•  Its complexity contributes to the emergence of corrupt practices 
•  It does not foment product quality, to the extent that subsidies 
reward quantity 
•  It does not combat environmental degradation 
 
From the standpoint of fairness, the CAP may also be criticized for at least 
two reasons:   
 
•  Subsidies are especially beneficial to the owners of large holdings, 
who normally have higher income levels, as subsidies via prices or 
income are usually established by taking average levels of 
efficiency as the benchmark 
•  The high levels of protection entailed are detrimental to developing 
countries through curbing their exports 
 
On top of this series of reasons that would support the advisability of 
reforming and reducing the funds allocated to the CAP, if we also take into 
consideration the grounds which, to the contrary, enable us to advocate the   30 
continuity of a policy of cohesion for the present and future members of the EU, 
the economic rationality of diverting resources from the direct subsidies of the 
CAP and its market intervention policies towards the Structural Measures or rural 
development measures may be argued. In this way, a more efficient and fairer 
allocation could be achieved without altering the agreed ceiling for the 
Community budget.  
 
Naturally, this solution has obstacles to its implementation of a political 
nature, in view of the importance of the lobbies that defend the CAP in its 
present structure and, further, the disparity that exists between the interests of the 
Member States of the Union in one policy or the other.    
 
In this respect, to appraise this “conflict of interests” it may prove useful 
to perform an exercise of simulation which will give us some idea of the extent to 
which the reform of the CAP or of the Structural Measures would affect each 
Member State. The results obtained in this exercise are shown intuitively in 
GRAPH 2   produced for the purpose. For its interpretation, note that every 
country has three bars with the following meaning. The first expresses the status 
quo: the real net balance in its financial relations with the EU obtained by every 
country on average in the years 2000 and 2001. The second bar refers to the 
mean net balance (% GDP) that it would have obtained in 2000 and 2001 – the 
periods of the current financial perspectives already terminated – in the extreme 
case that the Structural Measure funds of a regional nature disappeared, leaving 
only those of a national character: Objective 3 and the Cohesion Fund, assuming, 
furthermore, that the saving reverted in a proportional reduction in the 
contributions to the Community  budget of all the countries and that the other 
items of expenditure and their apportionment by Member States remained 
unaltered. The third bar shows the net balance that would have ensued in the 
other extreme case that the CAP direct subsidies disappeared  in the same 
circumstances as in the previous scenario. Note that the proposals for the reform   31 
and curbing of CAP expenditures that appear in the CAP Interim Review 
distributed by the Commission refer precisely to direct aid.  
 
Bearing the foregoing in mind, the interpretation of the graph showing the 
results for this simulation exercise is, therefore, as follows. In the case of the 
countries that had a positive balance in their financial relations with the EU in 
2000 and 2001 (those whose first bar lies above the x-axis, i.e.: Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain), it may be seen that the first bar is higher than those showing 
the effects of the reforms of the CAP and the Structural Measures. In other 
words, any of the reforms considered would  reduce the net funds that they obtain 
from the Community budget. However, they are not indifferent to the 
consequences of both options. In fact, for Greece, Spain and above all Portugal, 
the bar that expresses the consequences of the elimination of CAP direct aid is 
higher than the one representing the net balances after a possible reduction of the 
funds of a regional nature for Structural Measures, i.e. these three countries 
would suffer a less detrimental effect if the curb on Community spending fell on 
the CAP. To the contrary, Ireland would be more favoured by a reduction in the 
funds allocated to Structural Measures. Note that, even though this country has 
historically been the most benefited by this type of aid in terms relative to the 
GDP and population, as a result of its recent and spectacular development it has 
left its most populated region outside Objective 1 and will probably not be 
eligible for the Cohesion Fund when this is reviewed in 2003. 
  
For its part, in the countries with negative balances, the current balance 
bar of most of the countries is further away from the x-axis than those relative to 
the possible reforms. In fact, as many as eight countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and United Kingdom) could  reduce 
that net contributions to the Community budget with any of the reforms. They are 
joined by Finland, which could even eventually obtain positive fiscal balances 
with the EU if direct aid or Structural Funds of a regional nature were eliminated. 
Three of these eight countries (Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom) would    32 
reduce their negative balances even further if the reform affected Structural 
Measures, while the others would benefit to a greater extent from a reduction in 
CAP funds. Finally, France and Denmark  could have their negative balances 
increased if the reform affected the CAP, whereas this is what would happen to 
Italy if the Structural Measures were reformed.   
 
In short, taking into account the Members States as a whole, both those 
that have a positive balance and those that obtain a negative one, the results of 
this simulation exercise – shown in GRAPH 3 – which we have just commented 
on give us some idea of the complex conflict of interests that may come to light 
in the discussion of the forthcoming financial perspectives. This exercise also 
illustrates  the difficulty of an agreement being reached regarding what, from the 
standpoint of economic rationality, both in terms of efficiency and fairness, 
seems to be the best solution for addressing regional policy in the enlarged EU 
with the budgetary ceiling of 1.27%: reduce  CAP direct funds and allocate them 
to Structural Measures. 
 
Accordingly, despite the political complexity entailed in this solution, we 
may trust that criteria of efficiency and fairness will prevail and that, therefore, 
the forthcoming budget for 2007-2013 will follow these lines of reform. 
Fortunately, the conclusions that were reached at the Brussels Council give some 
grounds for confidence that this could be the case. Indeed, as was already 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, this Council decided some measures of 
constraint for the CAP, in particular: limitation of the nominal growth of the 
funds assigned to the CAP to 1% for the period 2007-2013 and establishment of 
the gradual scale of participation of new members in direct grants, until bringing 
them into line with that of the Fifteen in percentage terms, which means that if 
these grants were reduced to the Fifteen, they would be reduced to the new 
members as well.   
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In any case, from a technical standpoint we may defend the suitability of a 
proposed financial perspective for the period  2007-2013 which, in accordance 
with the conclusions of the Brussels European Council on the CAP, reduces  its 
funds for direct grants in favour  of the Structural Measures and other EU 
policies. This proposal is what is simulated in TABLE 11, the preparation of 
which is explained in detail in BOX  3. In fact, as may be seen, with this re-
allocation of funds, the Community budget could absorb the new members, 
including Bulgaria and Romania, without raising the maximum limit of own 
resources  and without harming the interests of the present Members States  - 
such as Greece, Portugal and Spain -  which still need the Structural Measures for 
their development. For this purpose it would be necessary, first of all, for 
payment credits - expenditures really executed in the cash flow in each year – to 
be increased gradually until reaching the maximum limit of current own 
resources, set at 1.27% of the EU GNP. We should remember that this limit is far 
from being achieved. Thus, in  2000 and 2001 the contributions of all the 
Member States only amounted to 1.12% and 1.11% of the EU GNP, respectively, 
leaving a margin of 0.15% and 0.16% of the GNP unused. What is more, for the 
last year of the current financial perspectives, 2006, a cash flow expenditure of 
around 1.06% of the GNP is forecast, which gives rise to a margin for incidentals 
of 0.21% of the GNP that will probably not be used. 
 
   In addition, the curb on CAP spending agreed at the Brussels Summit as 
well as the freezing of administrative costs would have to be put into effect. In 
this way, funds would be released to increase the Structural Measures, which 
would thereby become the largest item of  the Community budget. The candidate 
countries could therefore receive aid close to 4% of their GDP, the maximum 
specified in Agenda 2000, while the present Member States would not have to 
suffer a reduction in the funds they receive. Certainly, under our proposal the 
new Community members would obtain around 20%  of the total Community 
budget commitment credits by way of Structural Measures, thus significantly 
increasing their share in relation to 2006, whereas the present members would   34 
maintain their percentage of around 30% of the total, similar to that of the current 
period  2000-2006.   
 
The scenario we propose would also succeed in upgrading the importance 
of internal policies, which include above all grants to R&D activities spread over 
the Framework Programmes, something that seems beneficial, if not necessary, 
for reducing the EU technological lag in relation to the United States, which is 
considerable and increased during the nineties. Internal policies also finance 
measures relating to training, employment, and trans-European networks, factors 
that could foment economic growth in the EU, which, in the nineties at least, was 
significantly lower than the growth recorded by the USA. There would also be 
resources left over to allocate to External Measures aimed at upgrading the role 
of the EU in the world 
 
In short, the financial perspectives proposed – the figures must, of course, 
be interpreted in their order of magnitude -  would entail a gradual increase in the 
share of the new Community members, who would  improve their situation 
considerably in relation to the initial years of EU membership in which, as 
happened to Spain and Portugal, they could even record negative fiscal balances 
in the first year. For their part, the present Member States would reduce the 
percentage  of the funds received as direct CAP aid but not that of the Structural 




To produce Table 11  – which shows our proposal for the future financial  
perspectives – the EU GDP is estimated for the period 2006-2013. For this purpose we 
take into account the estimates of growth of the EU GDP and of Community prices 
published recently by the European Commission for 2002, 2003 and 2004 and for the 
later years we assume a real growth of the EU GDP of 2.5% a year, and of 2% a year 
for Community prices, as foreseen for the financial perspectives for the period 2000-
2006 in Agenda 2000 and at the Berlin Summit. It is also assumed that the growth of the  
EU GDP for those years will be similar to that of its GNP, which is the magnitude used 
as the benchmark in the Community budget. 
 
In this way, we obtain the maximum limit of own resources, which is 1.27% of 
the EU GNP. We also propose to raise the payment credit ceiling gradually from 1.06% 
of the EU  GNP in 2006 until reaching the maximum limit of own resources of 1.27% of 
the  GNP in 2013. The total commitment credits for the period 2000-2006 are estimated 
on the assumption that the same proportion to payment credits will be maintained as in 
2006. With regard to distribution of the Community budget by items, we start out from 
the 2006 distribution. Thus, in the case of the CAP it is assumed that the budgetary 
ceiling is used and, therefore, the expenditures for 2006 will record an annual increase 
of 1%, as agreed  at the Berlin Summit. In relation to administrative expenses and funds 
allocated to the reserve, our proposal is that the same ratio of the GNP should be 
maintained as in the current period 2000-2006. We also propose that the other items - 
Structural Measures, Internal Policies and External Measures – should share out the 
surplus commitment credits, i.e. all the commitment credits except the funds allotted to 
the CAP, administrative expenses and reserves. In this way, these policies could assume 
greater importance and the resources with which they are funded could be increased in 
the period 2007-2013 in relation to financial perspectives 2000-2006. The share-out 
amongst these three items would be proportional to that of  2006.   
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Box 3 (cont.) 
 
Lastly, with regard to distribution amongst new and current members it is   
estimated that the candidate countries will obtain funds allocated to Structural 
Measures for a  value of  4% of their GDP,  the ceiling set in Agenda 2000, and that a 
third of this aid will be under the Cohesion Fund. The distribution of the rest of the  
Structural Measures amongst the present Member States is divided between Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund in the same way as in 2006. For Internal Policies it is 
assumed that the distribution between present and new Member States will be the same 
as in 2006, since increasing the participation in the financing of the Framework 
Programme requires several years’ running-in and a technological position  
comparable with the Community average, a situation from which the candidate 




7. Conclusions and recommendations  
 
This study started off by setting forth the arguments that justify 
government  intervention through  regional policy in order to combat t he 
imbalances present in the levels of economic development between countries and 
even more so between regions. Furthermore, it was argued that it would be wise 
for the EU to continue applying a Community regional policy to address the 
geographical income disparities that still exist in the Union and which will no 
doubt become more accentuated with the accession of countries that have a 
tremendous difference in income level compared with the Fifteen.  
 
Then, after a brief description of the objectives and instruments shaping 
the current European regional policy,  we analyzed not only the fiscal balances of 
each of the Fifteen with the Union budget, but also the participation of every one 
of the countries in the essential instrument of Community regional policy: the  
Structural Measures. This analysis allowed us to reveal some facts that deserve to   37 
be taken into consideration in any of the reforms that may be undertaken in order 
to bring regional policy into line with the enlarged EU. Amongst these we would 
single out two. The first is the existence of problems of horizontal equity in the  
contributions of the Fifteen to the Community budget. In other words, the fiscal 
balances are not fully linked, as would be desirable, to the per capita income 
level of the countries, since there are frequent cases of countries that contribute 
more to the budget than would correspond to them, such as Germany, Sweden 
and Holland, as well as others, such as Spain, that receive less than they should. 
The other fact, related to the previous one, is that, as opposed to what is usually 
affirmed, Spain is not the country that has most benefited from the  Structural 
Measures policy.  
 
The next step of the investigation consisted of assessing the extent of the 
“statistical effect” entailed in enlargement and by virtue of which a part of the  
regions that currently benefit from regional funds which have an income level of 
less than 75% of the EU average would be deprived of these  on account of the 
relative “enrichment” that would take place in purely statistical terms as a result 
of the reduction in mean per capita income that would be entailed in enlargement 
of the EU to 25 (and even more so to 27) members. In this respect,  in this study 
we argue the unfairness of the proposal, defended by some of the current net 
contributors to the Community budget, of not introducing reforms to correct this 
“statistical effect”,  inasmuch as this would be contrary to the principle of  
cohesion accepted in the Treaty of the Union. Indeed, if this effect is not 
corrected, a situation will be reached in which the brunt of the funding needs 
generated by the application of regional policy to the new members will mainly 
be borne by the less developed countries of the Fifteen currently forming the EU.  
 
Therefore, after simulating the costs that would be entailed in not 
correcting this “statistical effect” for the regions (and hence the countries) that 
currently benefit from aid to the less developed regions of the Fifteen, including 
the Spanish ones, in this s tudy we defend the advisability of introducing a   38 
corrective mechanism that may enable the regions of the present members that 
would continue to be beneficiaries of aid to Objective 1 regions, if there were no 
enlargement, to go on receiving it.  
 
Furthermore, our study upholds a more ambitious proposal: to undertake a 
reduction in the Community budget funds allocated to direct CAP aid in order to 
release funds both for the regional policy and for other Community policies. As 
argued, the transfer of funds we propose would give rise to a Community budget 
spending structure that is more equitable and efficient and, therefore, more suited 
to the desirable aim of fomenting the growth of the economies of the European 
Union as a whole. 
 
Naturally, from a technical standpoint it is possible to uphold even more 
ambitious budgetary reforms, which, unlike this one, would involve raising the 
budgetary ceiling of the Union from 1.27% of the GNP of the members. In other 
respects, this would be feasible if, in accordance with some of the Commission’s 
proposals, a Community tax were introduced. However, this proposal  - sensible 
moreover, especially for us members who share the euro -  does not have the 
minimum political backing for the time being.   39 
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(1) ecu of 1988 % s/total ecu of 1992 % s/total euro of 1999 % s/total
1. Common Agricultural Policy 142.200   38,3   255.520   38,1   350.471   41,8  
2. Structural Measures 53.140   14,3   176.398   26,3   283.392   33,8  
     2.1 Structural Funds 53.140   14,3   161.248   24,1   245.242   29,3  
     2.2 Cohesion Fund 15.150   2,3   29.921   3,6  
     2.3 Pre-accession Aid 8.229   1,0  
3. Internal Policies 31.587   4,7   53.298   6,4  
4. External Measures 
(2)
44.498   18,2   32.400   4,8   48.583   5,8  
5. Administration 25.480   3,8   39.926   4,8  
6. Reserves 5.000   1,3   8.500   1,3   4.527   0,5  
TOTAL 244.838   65,9   529.885   79,1   780.197   93,1  
Allocation for payments (% GNP) 1,11 1,22 1,09
Own resources ceiling (% GNP)
1,20 1,27 1,27
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TABLE 2. Payments, income and net balance of the EU countries in relation to the Community budget 
 
Annual contributions to the Community Annual funds received from the Community Net annual budgetary balance
budget (% GDP) budget (% GDP) (% GDP)
Country 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001
Belgium 1,3   1,4   1,4   1,0   0,9   0,7   -0,3   -0,4   -0,6  
Denmark 0,9   1,0   1,0   1,2   1,0   0,8   0,3   0,0   -0,2  
Germany 1,1   1,1   1,0   0,4   0,5   0,5   -0,6   -0,6   -0,5  
Greece 1,0   1,1   1,1   5,3   5,1   4,5   4,3   4,0   3,4  
Spain 1,0   1,0   1,0   1,6   2,2   1,9   0,5   1,2   0,9  
France 1,0   1,0   1,0   0,8   0,9   0,8   -0,2   -0,1   -0,2  
Ireland 1,1   1,2   1,0   6,4   4,4   2,2   5,2   3,2   1,2  
Italy 0,9   0,9   0,9   0,8   0,8   0,8   -0,1   -0,2   -0,1  
Luxembourg 1,1   1,2   1,0   0,6   0,7   0,5   -0,6   -0,5   -0,6  
Netherlands 1,3   1,4   1,3   1,2   0,7   0,5   -0,1   -0,8   -0,9  
Austria 0,9   1,0   0,6   0,7   -0,3   -0,3  
Portugal 1,1   1,2   1,1   3,4   4,0   2,6   2,3   2,8   1,5  
Finland 0,8   0,9   0,7   0,9   -0,1   0,0  
Sweden 0,9   1,0   0,5   0,5   -0,4   -0,6  
United Kingdom 0,8   0,9   0,7   0,5   0,5   0,4   -0,3   -0,3   -0,3  
Source:  Directorate General for Budgets and Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy (Spring 2002).
         European Commission; European Court of Auditors: Annual Report.    46 
 
TABLE 3. Equity of the distribution of the net Community budget balances amongst Member States 
 
Net annual budgetary balance (% GDP) Net theoretical annual budgetary balance  (% GDP).  Difference 
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2001
Belgium -0,3 -0,4 -0,6 -0,4 -0,6 -0,3 0,1 0,1 -0,4
Denmark 0,3 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 -0,9 -0,8 0,6 1,0 0,7
Germany -0,6 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 -0,2 -0,3 -0,2 -0,3
Greece 4,3 4,0 3,4 1,6 2,7 2,2 2,7 1,3 1,2
Spain 0,5 1,2 0,9 0,8 1,5 1,0 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1
France -0,2 -0,1 -0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -0,2
Ireland 5,2 3,3 1,2 1,0 0,0 -0,8 4,2 3,4 2,0
Italy -0,1 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg -0,6 -0,5 -0,6 -1,5 -2,5 -2,4 0,9 2,0 1,8
Netherlands -0,1 -0,8 -0,9 -0,2 -0,6 -0,6 0,1 -0,2 -0,2
Austria 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 0,0 -0,5 -0,5 0,0 0,2 0,1
Portugal 2,3 2,8 1,5 1,8 2,2 1,7 0,6 0,7 -0,2
Finland 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,1
Sweden 0,0 -0,5 -0,6 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 -0,4 -0,5
United Kingdom -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,3 -0,3 -0,2
Souce: Own prepartion from European Commision: Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical; European Commision: Allocation  
of 2001 EU by Member State; Court of Auditors: Court of Auditors' Annual Report.  
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TABLE 4.  Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund per capita. 
 
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006
Total Structural Ob. nº 1 Total Structural Cohesion Ob. nº 1 Cohesion Total Structural Ob. nº 1 Cohesion
Funds Regions Funds Fund Regions Fund Funds Regions Fund
Belgium 102,4   244,6   85,2   233,8   71,7  
Denmark 99,0   190,0   182,1  
Germany 103,9   47,8   315,0   197,7   428,3   287,2  
Greece 954,8   872,3   32,4   1712,8   1582,2   899,7   2688,3   2264,5   330,6  
Spain 433,6   310,0   26,2   1038,8   793,1   78,5   1634,2   1107,7   324,5  
France 131,4   19,4   296,7   43,5   302,0   73,4  
Ireland 1598,0   1498,8   47,7   1983,5   1826,2   422,8   1200,5   932,8   217,5  
Italy 238,5   177,6   447,2   307,0   605,4   451,6  
Luxembourg 235,8   287,8   235,3  
Netherlands 64,1   199,2   11,4   239,7   9,0  
Austria 278,1   28,6   266,4   38,0  
Portugal 1100,1   1013,3   34,1   1795,2   1668,6   310,4   2673,3   2235,1   359,4  
Finland 458,3   476,2   208,0  
Sweden 209,9   290,6   96,0  
United Kingdom 109,4   16,3   261,5   47,5   326,6   123,0  
Source: First and Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (1996 and 2001), AMECO and Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex
              of European Economy (Spring 2002). European Commission.  
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1989-1993 1994-1999 (1994 prices) 2000-2006 (1999 prices)
Total Structural Ob. nº 1 Cohesion Total Structural Ob. nº 1 Cohesion Total Structural Ob. nº 1 Cohesion
Funds Regions Fund Funds Regions Fund Funds Regions Fund
Belgium 86,3   206,1 71,8 197,1 60,4
Denmark 83,4   160,1 153,4
Germany 87,6   40,3 265,5 166,6 360,9 242,0
Greece 804,7   735,2 27,3 1443,5 1333,4 758,3 2265,6 1908,5 278,6
Spain 365,5   261,2 22,1 875,5 668,4 66,1 1377,3 933,5 273,5
France 110,7   16,4 250,0 36,7 254,5 61,8
Ireland 1346,7   1263,2 40,2 1671,6 1539,1 356,3 1011,7 786,2 183,3
Italy 201,0   149,7 376,9 258,7 510,2 380,6
Luxembourg 198,7   242,5 198,3
Netherlands 54,0   167,9 9,6 202,0 7,6
Austria 234,4 24,1 224,5 32,0
Portugal 927,2   854,0 28,7 1513,0 1406,3 261,6 2253,0 1883,7 302,9
Finland 386,3 401,3 175,3
Sweden 176,9 244,9 80,9
United Kingdom 92,2   13,7 220,4 40,1 275,2 103,7    49 
TABLE 5. Distribution of the Cohesion Fund in all planning periods. 
 
Cohesion Fund Distribution Cohesion Fund Distribution Cohesion Fund per capita
in millon euro of 2002 in relative terms (%)  (euro of 2002/per capita)
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006
Greece 425   10.056   3.286   17,9   18,0   17   41,5   959,2   299,2  
Spain 1.303   3.291   11.985   54,9   55,0   62   33,5   83,6   293,7  
Ireland 215   1.646   773   9,1   9,0   4   61,0   450,7   196,9  
Portugal 431   3.290   3.286   18,1   18,0   17   43,5   331,0   325,3  
Total 
(1)
2.373   18.284   19.331   100   100   100   37,9   288,3   293,7  
Source:  Directorate General for Budgets and Directorate General ECFIN, AMECO Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy (Spring 2002)
             European Commission.
              (1) Total Cohesion Fund per capita = Total Cohesion Fund/average population of Gr, E, Irl, P of each programming period.  
 
Cohesion Fund Distribution Cohesion Fund Distribution Cohesion Fund per capita
in million ecu/euro in relative terms (%)  (euro/per capita)
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006
Greece 280   7.950   3.060   17,9   55,0   17   27,3   758,3   278,6  
Spain 859   2.602   11.160   54,9   18,0   62   22,1   66,1   273,5  
Ireland 142   1.301   720   9,1   9,0   4   40,2   356,3   183,3  
Portugal 284   2.601   3.060   18,1   18,0   17   28,7   261,6   302,9  
Total 
(1)
1.565   14.454   18.000   100   100   100   25,0   227,9   273,5    
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TABLE 6. Gross Value Added and Farm Employment Share of the Total. 2001. 
 
Agri. GVA Agr. Employment















Source: European Commission: Regular Reports (2000); AMECO, INE; EUROSTAT.    51 
TABLE 7. Structure of Community expenditures according to the financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006 (% of total 
expenditures). 
 
Financial perspectives 1994-1999* Berlin Summit (EU-15)**                           Brussels and Copenhagen Summits (EU-25)***
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agricultural Guideline 43,7 45,1 46,4 46,8 46,9 43,8 44,0 43,5
    Present Member States 43,7 44,5 45,8 46,3 46,4 41,4 39,9 39,1
    Candidate countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,8 3,6 3,9
    Pre-accession aid 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5
Structural Measures 37,7 36,0 34,8 34,5 34,4 37,0 36,9 37,5
    Present Member States 37,7 34,8 33,7 33,4 33,2 30,1 29,4 28,2
         Structural Funds  34,8 32,0 30,9 30,6 30,5 27,7 27,0 25,9
         Cohesion Funds 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,4 2,4 2,4
    Candidate countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,9 6,6 8,3
    Pre-accession aid 0,0 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,0 1,0
Internal Policies 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,7 7,6 7,5 7,5
    Present Member States 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,7 6,2 6,2 6,2
    Candidate countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,3 1,3
External Measures 6,6 6,6 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,0 5,9 5,8
    Pre-accession aid 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,5 1,5 1,5
    Other 4,9 4,9 4,8 4,9 4,5 4,4 4,3
Administration 4,6 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,3 5,4
    Present Member States 4,6 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,1 4,8 4,8 4,8
    Candidate countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,6
Reserves 1,2 1,0 0,9 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
Total commitment credits 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
    Present Member States 92,2 90,7 90,9 91,2 91,4 82,5 80,2 78,4
    Candidate countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,6 12,0 14,0
    Pre-accession aid 0,0 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,0 3,0 2,9
    Non-imputable 7,8 5,9 5,8 5,5 5,3 4,9 4,8 4,7
Total payment credits 93,2 97,4 97,5 99,4 100,6 94,6 95,9 95,3
Payment credits ( % GNP) 1,23 1,12 1,11 1,09 1,07 1,08 1,09 1,06
Own resources ceiling ( % GNP) 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27
(*) In 1999 Structural Funds include an amount corresponding to the European Economic Space (EES) financial mechanism, as 
    well as an adjustment of the 1997 budget. 
(**) For 2002 and 2003 the financial perspectives established at the Berlin Summit are modified taking into account that accession will begin in  2004 
     (two years later than foreseen at that European Council) and taking into consideration the technical adjustments made when adopting the Community budget for 2002.
(***)This distribution takes into account the modifications made in the final  SEC(2002) 102 after 2004 was set as the date for accession of the candidate 
      countries, as well as the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Brussels European Council and the Presidency of the Copenhagen European Council
Source: Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen European Council (12 and 13 December, 2002); Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council 
(24 and 25 October, 2002); Conclusions of the Presidency, Berlin European Council (24 and 25 March, 1999);European Commission: SEC(2002) 102 and European Economy Group.  52 
TABLE 8. The “statistical effect” of enlargement on the per capita income level of the Fifteen. 
 
Per capita Income in Purchasing Power Parities*:
UE15=100 EU25=100 UE27=100
(1999-2001) (1999-2001) (1999-2001)
Belgium 106,5 117,2 122,8
Denmark 120,5 132,6 139,0
Germany 105,3 115,9 121,4
Greece 68,6 75,5 79,2
Spain 82,8 91,2 95,5
France 99,4 109,4 114,6
Ireland 117,5 129,3 135,5
Italy 102,8 113,1 118,5
Luxembourg 193,3 212,8 222,9
Netherlands 114,8 126,3 132,4
Austria 110,6 121,8 127,6
Portugal 73,6 81,0 84,8
Finland 102,0 112,3 117,6
Sweden 101,5 111,7 117,0
United Kingdom 101,6 111,8 117,1
EU-15 100,0 110,0 115,3
* The EU(15) are the present Member States of the European Union. The EU(25)are these fifteen countries plus the ten who willmost probably will be joining 
  in 2004 or later years: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuanía, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovak Republic. The EU(27) are the set 
  of States forming the EU(25) plus the two who are expected to jpoin in the next financial perspectives.  2007-2013: Bulgaria and Romania. 
 Source:  European Commision: Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical  Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002 .   53 
TABLE 9. Simulation of the impact of the “statistical effect” on the Objective 1 regions prior to possible EU enlargement scenarios for 
the perspectives for the period 007-2013. 
Objective 1                                    Without enlargement                                    Enlargement UE-25
                                    (2000-2006)                                     (2007-2013)                                     (2007-2013)
Germany (5)
 Brandenburg Ireland (1) Germany (5) Ireland (0)
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Border, Midland and Western  Brandenburg Border, Midland, Western   ?
 Sachsen  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
 Sachsen-Anhalt  Sachsen
 Thüringen Italy (6)  Sachsen-Anhalt Italy (4)
Campania  Thüringen Campania
Greece (13) Puglia Puglia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki Basilicata Greece (10) Basilicata  ?
Kentriki Makedonia Calabria Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki Calabria
Dytiki Makedonia Sicilia Kentriki Makedonia Sicilia
Thessalia Sardegna Dytiki Makedonia Sardegna   ?
Ipeiros Thessalia
Ionia Nisia Austria (1) Ipeiros Austria (1)
Dytiki Ellada Burgenland Ionia Nisia Burgenland
Sterea Ellada Dytiki Ellada
Peloponnisos Portugal (6) Sterea Ellada   ? Portugal (6)
Attiki Norte Peloponnisos Norte
Voreio Aigaio Centro  Attiki   ? Centro 
Notio Aigaio Alentejo Voreio Aigaio Alentejo
Kriti Algarve Notio Aigaio   ? Algarve
Açores   Kriti Açores 
Spain (10) Madeira   Madeira  
Galicia Spain (7)
Principado de Asturias Finland (3) Galicia Finland (1)
Castilla y León Itä-Suomi Principado de Asturias Itä-Suomi
Castilla-la Mancha Väli-Suomi Castilla y León    ? Väli-Suomi   ?
Extremadura Etelä-Suomi Castilla-la Mancha Etelä-Suomi   ?
Comunidad Valenciana Extremadura
Andalucia Comunidad Valenciana   ?
Murcia Sweden (3) Andalucia Sweden (0)
Ceuta y Melilla   Norra Mellansverige Murcia Norra Mellansverige   ?
Canarias   Mellersta Norrland Ceuta y Melilla   Mellersta Norrland   ?
Övre Norrland Canarias   ? Övre Norrland   ?
France (4)
Guadeloupe  United Kingdom (4) France (4) United Kingdom (3)
Martinique  Merseyside Guadeloupe  Merseyside
French Guiana  South Yorkshire Martinique  South Yorkshire   ?
Reunion  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly French Guiana  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
                        Total   56 West Wales and The Valleys Reunion  West Wales and The Valleys
                               Total* 41                               Total*   25
                                    Enlargement UE-25                       Ampliación UE-27
                                    (2007-2013)                                     (2007-2013)
Germany (1) Ireland (0) Germany (0) Ireland (0)
 Brandenburg   ? Border, Midland, Western   ?  Brandenburg   ? Border, Midland, Western   ?
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   ?  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  ?
 Sachsen   ?  Sachsen   ?
 Sachsen-Anhalt Italy (4)  Sachsen-Anhalt   ? Italia (1)
 Thüringen   ? Campania  Thüringen   ? Campania   ?
Puglia Puglia   ?
Greece (6) Basilicata   ? Greece (6) Basilicata   ?
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki Calabria Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki Calabria
Kentriki Makedonia   ? Sicilia Kentriki Makedonia   ? Sicilia   ?
Dytiki Makedonia   ? Sardegna   ? Dytiki Makedonia   ? Sardegna   ?
Thessalia Thessalia
Ipeiros Austria (0) Ipeiros Austria (0)
Ionia Nisia Burgenland   ? Ionia Nisia Burgenland   ?
Dytiki Ellada Dytiki Ellada
Sterea Ellada   ? Portugal (4) Sterea Ellada   ? Portugal (4)
Peloponnisos Norte Peloponnisos Norte
Attiki   ? Centro  Attiki   ? Centro 
Voreio Aigaio   ? Alentejo Voreio Aigaio   ? Alentejo
Notio Aigaio   ? Algarve   ? Notio Aigaio   ? Algarve   ?
Kriti   ? Açores   Kriti   ? Açores  
Madeira  ? Madeira   ?
Spain (5) Spain (2)
Galicia Finland (0) Galicia   ? Finland (0)
Principado de Asturias   ? Itä-Suomi   ? Principado de Asturias   ? Itä-Suomi   ?
Castilla y León   ? Väli-Suomi   ? Castilla y León   ? Väli-Suomi   ?
Castilla-la Mancha Etelä-Suomi   ? Castilla-la Mancha   ? Etelä-Suomi   ?
Extremadura Extremadura
Comunidad Valenciana   ? Comunidad Valenciana   ?
Andalucia Sweden (0) Andalucia Sweden (0)
Murcia   ? Norra Mellansverige   ? Murcia   ? Norra Mellansverige   ?
Ceuta y Melilla   Mellersta Norrland   ? Ceuta y Melilla   ? Mellersta Norrland   ?
Canarias   ? Övre Norrland   ? Canarias   ? Övre Norrland   ?
France (4) United Kingdom (1) France (4) United Kingdom (0)
Guadeloupe  Merseyside   ? Guadeloupe  Merseyside   ?
Martinique  South Yorkshire   ? Martinique  South Yorkshire   ?
French Guiana  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly French Guiana  Cornwall, Isles of Scilly   ?
Reunion  West Wales, The Valleys   ? Reunion  West Wales, The Valleys   ?
                              Total*   25                              Total*  17
* The regions that would be excluded in each scenario are marked. The Canary Islands benefit from Objective 1 through being an ultraperipheral region, while the regions of Sweden and Finland do so because of low density population (old Objective 6 of the p
  they may go on benefiting from this Objective even though they exceed the limit of  75%. Furthermore, Hainao (Belgium) would enter Objective 1 if there were no enlargement, as in the last few years it has suffered a crisis that has left it with less than
 Source: Own preparation from European Commission: Statistical Annex of the First Interim Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 2002 and Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002 .     54 
TABLE 10. Estimated cost of enlargement in relation to Objective 1 measures.  
(million euro 2002) (%GDP) (euro per capita)
UE-15 UE-25 UE-27 UE-15 UE-25 UE-27 UE-15 UE-25 UE-27
Belgium 0 663 663 Belgium 0 0,04 0,04 Belgium 0 65 65
Denmark 0 0 0 Denmark 0 0 0 Denmark 0 0 0
Germany 0 15269 18650 Germany 0 0,11 0,14 Germany 0 186 227
Greece 6277 13079 13079 Greece 0,70 1,46 1,46 Greece 595 1241 1241
Spain 12096 16153 21292 Spain 0,28 0,37 0,49 Spain 306 409 539
France 0 0 0 France 0 0 0 France 0 0 0
Ireland 1395 1395 1395 Ireland 0,17 0,17 0,17 Ireland 368 368 368
Italy 5370 5370 11327 Italy 0,07 0,07 0,14 Italy 94 94 198
Luxembourg 0 0 0 Luxembourg 0 0 0 Luxembourg 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 Netherlands 0 0 0 Netherlands 0 0 0
Austria 0 277 277 Austria 0 0,02 0,02 Austria 0 34 34
Portugal 0 3069 3069 Portugal 0 0,38 0,38 Portugal 0 307 307
Finland 0 0 0 Finland 0 0 0 Finland 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0 Sweden 0 0 0 Sweden 0 0 0
United Kingdom 0 1832 1832 United Kingdom 0 0,02 0,02 United Kingdom 0 31 31
Source: Own preparation from European Commission: Second Cohesion Report; European Commission: Annual Report on the Structural Funds and Ministry of the Economy   55 
TABLE 11. Proposed financial perspectives for the period 2007-2013 (% of total expenditures).    
Total 2007-2013
millones de euros de 2002
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agricultural Guideline 43,5 40,8 38,3 36,0 33,9 31,9 30,0 28,3 329357
   Present Member States 39,1 36,5 33,6 31,1 28,7 26,6 24,7 22,9 280091
    Candidate countries 3,9 4,3 4,7 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,4 49266
Structural Measures 37,5 40,9 42,9 44,8 46,5 48,1 49,7 51,1 454964
     Present Member States 28,2 20,5 22,8 24,9 26,9 28,7 30,5 32,1 263732
         Structural Funds  25,9 18,8 20,9 22,8 24,7 26,3 27,9 29,4 241638
         Cohesion Funds 2,4 1,7 1,9 2,1 2,3 2,4 2,6 2,7 22094
    Candidate countries 8,3 20,4 20,1 19,9 19,6 19,4 19,2 19,0 191232
          Structural Funds  5,5 13,6 13,4 13,2 13,1 12,9 12,8 12,7 127488
          Cohesion Funds 2,8 6,8 6,7 6,6 6,5 6,5 6,4 6,3 63744
Internal Policies 7,5 7,0 7,3 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,7 77804
   Present Member States 6,2 5,8 6,1 6,3 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 64318
    Candidate countries 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,5 13486
External Measures 5,8 5,6 5,9 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 62638
Administration 5,4 5,3 5,1 5,0 4,9 4,7 4,6 4,5 47255
   Present Member States 4,8 4,7 4,5 4,4 4,3 4,2 4,1 4,0 42004
    Candidate countries 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 5251
Reserves 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 3307
Total commitment credits 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 975686
    Present Member States 78,4 62,7 62,4 62,1 62,0 62,0 62,0 62,0 606301
    Candidate countries 14,0 26,1 26,3 26,4 26,4 26,3 26,3 26,1 256185
    Non-imputable 7,6 11,3 11,4 11,5 11,6 11,7 11,8 11,9 113200
Total payment credits 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,3 929829
Credits over parments ( % GNP) 1,06 1,09 1,12 1,15 1,18 1,21 1,24 1,27 -
Own resources ceiling ( % GNP) 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 1,27 -    56 
GRAPH 1: Relative net balance and per capita income of the Member States
(Average of the period 1989-2001)
Source: Own preparation from Directorate General for Budgets and Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy (Spring 2002)






































   57 
Source:  Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy (Spring 2002). European Commission
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GRAPH 3 Simulation of the Net Balance of the Member States (% GDP) for different   













Be Dk A Gr Es Fr Ir It Lu P Au Po Fi Su RU
Countries
Source: Own preparation from European Commission:  Allocation of 2001 EU operating 








   59
Annex 1: Per capita income forecasts of the EU regions
 and candidate countries in the period 2001-2004
In relation to
UE(15)=100  UE(25)=100 UE(27)=100
UE-15 100,0 110,0 115,2
UE-25 90,9 100,0 104,8
UE-27 86,8 95,4 100,0
Belgium
Région Bruxelles-capitale/Brussels hoofdstad gewest 216,3 237,9 249,2
Antwerpen 122,0 134,2 140,6
Limburg (B) 88,1 97,0 101,6
Oost-Vlaanderen 90,8 99,8 104,6
West-Vlaanderen 111,4 122,5 128,4
Vlaams Brabant 97,9 107,7 112,8
Brabant Wallon 99,7 109,7 114,9
Hainaut 68,2 75,1 78,6
Liège 80,1 88,1 92,4
Luxembourg (B) 76,4 84,1 88,1
Namur 75,0 82,5 86,5
Denmark 120,1 132,1 138,4
Germany
 Baden-Württemberg 118,0 129,8 136,0
 Bayern 121,5 133,7 140,1
 Berlin 95,6 105,2 110,2
 Brandenburg 69,1 76,0 79,6
 Bremen 139,9 153,9 161,3
 Hamburg 180,3 198,3 207,8
 Hessen 126,5 139,2 145,8
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 68,5 75,3 78,9
 Niedersachsen 94,4 103,8 108,8
 Nordrhein-Westfalen 105,9 116,5 122,1
 Rheinland-Pfalz 92,7 102,0 106,9
 Saarland 96,5 106,1 111,2
 Sachsen 69,7 76,7 80,4
 Sachsen-Anhalt 67,3 74,1 77,6
 Schleswig-Holstein 96,8 106,5 111,6
 Thüringen 69,0 75,9 79,6
Greece
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 59,7 65,7 68,8
Kentriki Makedonia 74,3 81,8 85,7
Dytiki Makedonia 70,6 77,6 81,3
Thessalia 64,0 70,4 73,7
Ipeiros 56,8 62,5 65,5
Ionia Nisia 64,2 70,7 74,0
Dytiki Ellada 56,2 61,9 64,8
Sterea Ellada 88,2 97,1 101,7
Peloponnisos 58,4 64,2 67,3
Attiki 81,3 89,4 93,7
Voreio Aigaio 69,6 76,5 80,2
Notio Aigaio 86,7 95,4 99,9
Kriti 72,7 80,0 83,8
Spain
Galicia 65,9 72,5 76,0
Principado de Asturias 71,5 78,6 82,4
Cantabria 78,9 86,8 91,0
Pais Vasco 102,9 113,2 118,5
Comunidad Foral de Navarra 105,9 116,5 122,1
La Rioja 93,6 103,0 107,9    60
Aragón 87,2 95,9 100,5
Comunidad de Madrid 113,8 125,2 131,1
Castilla y León 75,5 83,0 87,0
Castilla-la Mancha 65,2 71,7 75,1
Extremadura 52,4 57,6 60,4
Cataluña 101,9 112,0 117,4
Comunidad Valenciana 80,7 88,8 93,0
Baleares 102,5 112,7 118,1
Andalucia 60,5 66,5 69,7
Murcia 68,8 75,7 79,3
Ceuta y Melilla  (ES) 65,4 71,9 75,3
Canarias  (ES) 82,3 90,5 94,9
France
Île de France 154,3 169,8 177,9
Champagne-Ardenne 95,0 104,5 109,5
Picardie 82,0 90,2 94,5
Haute-Normandie 92,6 101,8 106,7
Centre 89,7 98,6 103,3
Basse-Normandie 83,6 91,9 96,3
Bourgogne 90,9 99,9 104,7
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 79,8 87,7 91,9
Lorraine 82,6 90,8 95,2
Alsace 102,5 112,7 118,1
Franche-Comté 86,1 94,7 99,2
Pays de la Loire 87,4 96,1 100,7
Bretagne 83,9 92,3 96,7
Poitou-Charentes 79,7 87,7 91,8
Aquitaine 92,0 101,2 106,0
Midi-Pyrénées 87,1 95,8 100,3
Limousin 80,7 88,8 93,0
Rhône-Alpes 103,0 113,2 118,6
Auvergne 84,6 93,0 97,5
Languedoc-Roussillon 78,2 86,0 90,2
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 89,6 98,6 103,3
Corse 82,0 90,2 94,5
Guadeloupe (FR) 56,4 62,0 65,0
Martinique (FR) 64,4 70,8 74,2
French Guiana (FR) 50,1 55,1 57,7
Reunion (FR) 51,1 56,2 58,9
Ireland 122,0 134,2 140,6
     Border, Midland and Western 89,8 98,8 103,5
     Southern and Eastern 133,5 146,9 153,9
Italy
Piemonte 120,5 132,6 138,9
Valle d'Aosta 126,8 139,5 146,1
Liguria 109,3 120,3 126,0
Lombardia 135,9 149,5 156,6
Trentino-Alto Adige 135,3 148,9 156,0
Veneto 121,2 133,3 139,7
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 115,3 126,9 132,9
Emilia-Romagna 131,3 144,5 151,4
Toscana 113,8 125,2 131,1
Umbria 101,6 111,7 117,1
Marche 104,6 115,1 120,6
Lazio 116,2 127,8 133,9    61
Abruzzo 83,7 92,1 96,5
Molise 81,2 89,3 93,6
Campania 66,1 72,7 76,1
Puglia 67,4 74,2 77,7
Basilicata 75,7 83,3 87,3
Calabria 62,9 69,1 72,4
Sicilia 66,4 73,1 76,6
Sardegna 79,5 87,4 91,6
Luxembourg 202,1 222,3 232,9
The Netherlands
Groningen 124,6 137,0 143,6
Friesland 93,6 103,0 107,9
Drenthe 89,2 98,2 102,8
Overijssel 99,1 109,0 114,2
Gelderland 101,0 111,1 116,4
Flevoland 79,4 87,4 91,5
Utrecht 150,5 165,6 173,5
Noord-Holland 135,4 149,0 156,1
Zuid-Holland 121,1 133,2 139,5
Zeeland 99,2 109,2 114,4
Noord-Brabant 114,7 126,2 132,2
Limburg (NL) 99,3 109,2 114,4
Austria
Burgenland 70,6 77,7 81,4
Niederösterreich 93,3 102,7 107,6
Wien 147,0 161,6 169,4
Kärnten 93,5 102,8 107,7
Steiermark 93,3 102,6 107,5
Oberösterreich 105,8 116,4 122,0
Salzburg 124,8 137,2 143,8
Tirol 110,7 121,8 127,6
Vorarlberg 114,0 125,4 131,4
Portugal
Norte 60,1 66,1 69,3
Centro (P) 56,5 62,1 65,1
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 100,7 110,8 116,0
Alentejo 56,8 62,5 65,5
Algarve 68,4 75,2 78,8
Açores  (PT) 52,8 58,1 60,9
Madeira  (PT) 73,0 80,3 84,1
Finland
Itä-Suomi 74,0 81,4 85,3
Väli-Suomi 82,7 90,9 95,3
Pohjois-Suomi 85,1 93,6 98,0
Uusimaa (suuralue) 141,8 156,0 163,4
Etelä-Suomi 93,7 103,0 107,9
Åland 142,5 156,8 164,2
Sweden
Stockholm 134,2 147,6 154,7
Östra Mellansverige 91,4 100,6 105,4
Sydsverige 90,7 99,8 104,5
Norra Mellansverige 94,8 104,3 109,3
Mellersta Norrland 97,7 107,5 112,6    62
Övre Norrland 96,6 106,3 111,3
Småland med öarna 98,7 108,6 113,8
Västsverige 87,1 95,8 100,4
United Kingdom
Tees Valley and Durham 75,9 83,5 87,5
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear 78,7 86,5 90,7
Cumbria 90,3 99,4 104,1
Cheshire 115,9 127,5 133,6
Greater Manchester 89,5 98,4 103,1
Lancashire 81,1 89,2 93,4
Merseyside 71,3 78,4 82,1
East Riding and North Lincolnshire 96,1 105,7 110,8
North Yorkshire 96,0 105,6 110,6
South Yorkshire 76,4 84,0 88,0
West Yorkshire 92,8 102,0 106,9
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 91,7 100,9 105,7
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northants 104,1 114,5 120,0
Lincolnshire 86,1 94,7 99,2
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warks 99,2 109,1 114,3
Shropshire and Staffordshire 88,1 96,9 101,5
West Midlands 93,5 102,8 107,7
East Anglia 111,5 122,7 128,5
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire 109,8 120,8 126,5
Essex 96,2 105,9 110,9
Inner London 245,4 270,0 282,8
Outer London 89,3 98,3 103,0
Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire 134,2 147,7 154,7
Surrey, East and West Sussex 109,0 119,9 125,6
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 113,9 125,3 131,2
Kent 94,8 104,3 109,3
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and North Somerset 106,2 116,8 122,4
Dorset and Somerset 88,3 97,1 101,7
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 66,3 73,0 76,4
Devon 79,8 87,8 92,0
West Wales and The Valleys 71,7 78,9 82,6
East Wales 98,0 107,8 112,9
North Eastern Scotland 121,1 133,2 139,6
Eastern Scotland 100,4 110,5 115,8
South Western Scotland 92,6 101,9 106,7
Highlands and Islands 74,6 82,1 86,0
Northern Ireland 78,0 85,8 89,9
Bãlgarija 28,3 31,1 32,6
     Severozapaden 24,4 26,8 28,1
     Severen Tsentralen 24,0 26,4 27,7
     Severoiztochen 24,5 27,0 28,3
     Yugozapaden 38,2 42,0 44,0
     Yuzhen Tsentralen 23,2 25,6 26,8
     Yugoiztochen 30,9 34,0 35,6
Kypros 83,8 92,1 96,5
Èeská Republika 60,6 66,7 69,9
     Praha 133,2 146,5 153,5
     Støední Èechy 50,9 56,0 58,6
     Jihozápad 55,7 61,3 64,2
     Severozápad 49,3 54,2 56,8
     Severovýchod 51,2 56,3 59,0    63
     Jihovýchod 52,4 57,6 60,4
     Støední Morava 48,2 53,0 55,6
     Moravskoslezsko 50,8 55,9 58,6
Eesti 38,8 42,7 44,7
Magyarország 53,3 58,6 61,4
     Közép-Magyarország 81,5 89,6 93,9
     Közép-Dunántúl 50,4 55,5 58,1
     Nyugat-Dunántúl 63,0 69,3 72,6
     Dél-Dunántúl 40,9 45,0 47,2
     Észak-Magyarország 34,5 38,0 39,8
     Észak-Alföld 33,3 36,6 38,4
     Dél-Alföld 38,6 42,5 44,5
Lietuva 31,7 34,9 36,5
Latvija 29,2 32,1 33,7
Malta 53,2 58,5 61,3
Polska 38,7 42,6 44,6
     Dolnoœl¹skie 39,4 43,4 45,5
     Kujawsko-Pomorskie 33,4 36,7 38,5
     Lubelskie 26,4 29,0 30,4
     Lubuskie 34,5 37,9 39,7
     £ódzkie 35,3 38,8 40,6
     Ma³opolskie 34,7 38,2 40,0
     Mazowieckie 60,5 66,6 69,7
     Opolskie 31,1 34,2 35,9
     Podkarpackie 28,1 30,9 32,3
     Podlaskie 27,9 30,7 32,2
     Pomorskie 39,3 43,3 45,3
     Œlaskie 41,6 45,8 48,0
     Œwiêtokrzyskie 30,1 33,2 34,7
     Warmiñsko-Mazurskie 29,8 32,8 34,4
     Wielkopolskie 41,5 45,6 47,8
     Zachodniopomorskie 38,5 42,3 44,4
România 24,9 27,4 28,7
     Nord-Est 18,8 20,6 21,6
     Sud-Est 25,2 27,7 29,0
     Sud 22,0 24,2 25,3
     Sud-Vest 23,3 25,6 26,8
     Vest 29,0 31,9 33,4
     Nord-Vest 22,8 25,1 26,3
     Centru 28,4 31,2 32,7
     Bucureºti 36,0 39,6 41,5
Slovenija 71,9 79,1 82,9
Slovenská Republika 50,5 55,5 58,2
     Bratislavský 99,9 109,9 115,2
     Západné Slovensko 46,9 51,6 54,0
     Stredné Slovensko 43,5 47,9 50,1
     Východné Slovensko 41,3 45,5 47,7
Source: Own preparation from European Commission: Statistical Annex to the First Interim Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 2002
and European Commission: Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial
 Affairs: Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 2002 .  EEG Working Papers Series 
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